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Parents everywhere want the best for their children. The best schools, the best jobs, and — 
ultimately — the best mates. Choosing a partner may be the single most important decision 
we make in life, since for most people, marriage and family are the foundation of happiness. 
But finding a compatible match becomes ever more difficult as societies become more 
developed and more complex. 
 
 
In traditional societies, children (both male and female, but especially female) had little 
choice about who to marry. One of the great accomplishments of the Communist era in China 
was the elimination of arranged marriages and the liberation of women. But that doesn’t 
mean that people today marry only for love. Matchmaking is making a comeback, especially 
among China’s middle class. 
 
 
Matchmaking has now become something of a competitive sport in China’s biggest cities. 
Matchmaking in today’s China is the job of the mothers. They promote their children’s 
prospects while enjoying a weekend out in a center-city park. Or not enjoying. Chinese 
mothers are known to be extremely competitive, and protective of their own children’s 
reputation. 
 
 
One of the many potential deal-breakers for prospective partners in China is the potential 
spouse’s residency status, or hukou. Every person in China is registered to a particular place, 
and although the freedom to move residence is slowly increasing in China, people’s 
legal hukou still has a strong influence on their access to education, healthcare, and property 
rights. 
 
 
Legal hukou is especially important in big cities like Beijing and Shanghai. These cities are 
considered highly desirable places to live, and as a result their city governments are very 
selective in extending local hukou rights. When a registered resident of one of these cities 
marries an outsider, it can take up to 10 years for the spouse to gain local hukou. 
 
 
As a result, parents in these major cities consider local hukou a strategic asset for their 
children, akin to inheriting an apartment or attending a good university. The proud 
matchmaking mother of a big-city child might demand that a prospective rural mate bring to 
the table a higher degree or more property than her own child, to even out the score. 
 
 
But the more difficult the negotiations, the harder it becomes to find a mate. An unintended 
consequence of modern matchmaking is that people are marrying later. The average age at 
first marriage in China is now 26 years old, similar to the age in Western countries. For 
women in big cities like Shanghai the average age is over 30 — and climbing. 
 
 
The later people marry, the less likely they are to have children. Since 2016, families in 
China have been allowed to have two children, but it is becoming clear that few will ever 
reach that point. Late family formation, career disruptions, and the high costs of raising 
children are discouraging Chinese families from going beyond one child. 
 
 
Ironically, by encouraging their children to hold out for the perfect match, Chinese mothers 
may be reducing their chances of getting what many of them most desire: grandchildren. The 
longer people put off family formation, the fewer children they have. This is leading to the 
perpetuation of the “4-2-1”family structure in China, in which four grandparents and two 
parents all compete to share the affection of just one grandchild. 
 
 
Childless China 
 
 
China was once infamous for its draconian one child policy, under which most couples were 
limited to having just one child. Exceptions were made for some ethnic minorities, farm 
families, and families where both parents were themselves only children. But for the most 
part the policy was strictly enforced — by fines, denial of services, and even forced 
abortions. 
 
 
Today, Chinese parents still need a license to have children, but all couples are now allowed 
to have two children. The problem for the country’s demographic health is that they don’t 
want to. For most Chinese families, one is enough. 
 
 
China’s total fertility rate is now hovering at around 1.2 or 1.3 children per 
woman, well below the replacement rate of 2.1 required to maintain a stable 
population. 
 
 
People in Western countries are also getting married later and having fewer children, but in 
Western countries there are two balancing forces that tend to keep the population stable. 
First, in Western countries there are at least some people, often recent immigrants, who have 
larger families. In China, every family is capped at two children. 
 
 
Second, Western countries have come to accept the idea that couples can have children out of 
wedlock. In Anglo-Saxon countries like the United States and theUnited Kingdom, more than 
40 percent of all children are born to unmarried couples. Many of those couples later go on to 
marry, but they don’t have to wait until they’re married to start having children. 
 
 
In China, by contrast, having children outside of marriage is illegal and single mothers 
face substantial fines that can force them to give up their children for adoption — or worse. 
 
 
The net result is that China’s total fertility rate is now hovering at around 1.2 or 1.3 children 
per woman, well below the replacement rate of 2.1 required to maintain a stable population. 
Government policy is partly to blame. But similar problems across the region suggest that 
even without the one-child or two-child policy, China would still be facing a demographic 
crisis. 
 
 
A Regional Crisis 
 
 
China is not the first Asian country to face an aging crisis, and it won’t be the last. Dramatic 
increases in life expectancy have combined with equally dramatic declines in fertility to 
produce rapidly aging populations throughout the region. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are 
already struggling to cope with huge populations of retirees. Vietnam is expected to 
follow over the next few decades. 
 
 
But other Asian countries are making major efforts to address their declining fertility. For 
example, Singapore is holding a public debate about the needs of parents and the barriers 
they face in having more children. Options on the table include greater parental leave, split 
parental leave in which both the mother and the father take time off, and more family-
friendly workplaces. Such measures go well beyond the blunt cash-for-babies subsidies of the 
past. 
 
 
China doesn’t have an open society in which people can air ideas about how to adjust to new 
social realities. While other East Asian countries debates the meaning of love, marriage, and 
raising children in the twenty-first century, in China, the government controls the debate and 
represses dissent. As a result, creative solutions that might lead to broad societal change 
never receive a hearing. 
 
 
Most of the debate in China about changing family structures is happening inside government 
think tanks like the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Ordinary people are left out, and 
left to their own devices. As young couples increasingly pursue twenty-first century lives, 
mothers get ever more desperate to match up their children. The solution is a more open 
society, but openness is the one solution that the Chinese government cannot accept. 
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